To facilitate research on the concrete manifestations of the aesthetics of democracy, the relationships between democracy as a form of coexistence and democracy as a state and as a form of government must be further conceptualized. As a heuristic analytical framework for the aesthetic dimension of the tension between form and transformation, we work with a multilevel model of democratic coexistence in which the aesthetic appears in four registers. These registers are: (a) aesthetic orders (at the infrastructural and institutional levels preceding individual practices); (b) aesthetic action (at the interpersonal level of practices); (c) aesthetic objects (where social practices and imaginative counterproposals are expressed and materialized); and (d) aesthetic experiences (which concern collective forms of subjectivation).

This four-level model serves as a tool for examining concrete expressions of democratic coexistence from multiple aesthetic dimensions. The four research areas are derived from this model. Each area initially focuses on one level, all of which are interrelated. Doctoral projects are assigned to one research area based on which level constitutes the primary perspective in the project design. At the same time, these projects also investigate the interactions between the four dimensions.

In our multilevel model, which draws analogies to models from social philosophy (Saar 2019c) and cultural sociology (Reckwitz 2016), aesthetic orders provide a framework for democracy as a form of coexistence. They provide the conditions for shaping levels of action, objects, and experience. Aesthetic orders determine what is and is not perceptible. In this regard, Jacques Rancière’s influential formulation of the “distributions of the sensible” (Rancière 2010, 36) is central. However, the conceptual distinction he suggests between the perceptible and the imperceptible requires closer examination, as political-aesthetic orders are internally differentiated. For example, they differ in terms of center and periphery (Lotman 1979 and 1990; see also Koschorke and Voelz 2018). Aisthesis (the perception of what is included within the domain of the perceptible) overlaps with aesthetic categories and value ascriptions. Thus, the distinction between what is included and excluded overlaps with the distinction between the “admissible” and “inadmissible” (Manow 48), and the distinction between the representable and the non-representable overlaps with the distinction between the “presentable” and “non-presentable” (Ostiguy 75). Therefore, we do not understand the level of aesthetic order to be dichotomous; it does not primarily operate on the basis of binaries such as “visible/invisible” or “perceptible/imperceptible.” Instead, we assume that aesthetic orders arrange aisthesis hierarchically. The imperceptible is not necessarily located outside the order of the sensible but may appear within it, albeit in a concealed place. Once structuralist models of order become dynamic, the research shifts to the hierarchies of sensorial expression and perception. These hierarchies result from “strong evaluation” (Taylor 1989), consecration and sacralization (Appadurai, Karpik, Leypoldt), and banishment (Geisenhanslüke, 2018). Binary categories (“inside or outside,” “presence or absence”) are replaced by categories that describe spectral gradations, such as “foreground and background” or “relevance and irrelevance” (Tamarkin). Additionally, gradual descriptions of aesthetic form, such as “vivid and pale,” “loud and quiet,” “thick and thin,” and “blurry and clear,” are useful for analyzing aesthetic orders.

Although aesthetic orders can take a material, objective, and often lasting form within institutions and infrastructures, we do not view them as transhistorical, but rather as subject to historical change. Aesthetic orders are both the subject and the framing of democratic dissensus. Therefore, studies of aesthetic orders are also studies of their negotiation. Thus, investigating aesthetic orders necessitates considering the interactions between the four levels of our model.

Exemplary thematic complex, Research Area 1:
From the perspective of “aesthetic orders,” our first thematic complex explores invisibility, a central yet under-theorized social phenomenon. It does not refer to physical invisibility, but rather to a structural lack of attention to something that is visible but overlooked, bypassed, or looked through (Rebentisch 2022; Brighenti). In our framework, invisibility can be conceptualized as a solidified order of the sensible, based on exclusions and characteristics that undermine real forms of democratic coexistence, even if invisibility sometimes becomes the subject of dissensus, particularly in aesthetic terms. While invisibility as a (non-)relation has been studied more frequently in recent social philosophy (Honneth 2003; Schaffer 2008), migration research (Wilcke), de/postcolonial studies (Král; Schmidt-Linsenhoff; Hayes 2024a, 2024b), Black studies (Hartman 1997; Harney/Moten 2016; Moten, 2018), and queer studies (Edelman), it has rarely been addressed as a challenge to democratic theory. Most of this research has focused on moments when the previously invisible enters political demonstration (Rancière, 2002). In our research program, we propose that democratic theory must complement aisthesis with a critical theory of institutionalized and habitualized forms of perception, so as to better understand the dynamic between form/order and dissensus. Studies of artistic forms of invisibility in literature and art—such as contemporary “erasure poetry” (Schaefer 2024a, 2024b) and art photography (Azoulay, Krause-Wahl, 2022a)—offer particularly productive insights for this endeavor.

Our conception of “aesthetic action” does not refer to a specific type of action; rather, it refers to a particular perspective from which actions are perceived. Actions are aesthetic to the extent that their sensory aspect comes to the forefront. Social practices such as appearing to one another, affecting one another, and collaborating in engagement with the world appear as fundamentally aesthetic-affective. This allows for the usage of the conception of a “social aesthetics” (Carnevali). From our overarching perspective, we are interested in how particular aesthetic actions contribute to the dynamic of conflict and transformation. Aesthetic actions are useful for analysis because we assume that “actions themselves […] are constitutive of what can later confront them as a fixed order of practices—in a dialectic of constituting and constituted, or institution and instituted” (Saar 2019c, 164). In their solidified states, actions become social forms, such as customs, usages, rule-following, or rituals. However, actions are also the medium for contesting these social forms. The central question of the second area is what insights particular social practices, when considered aesthetically, may provide into the dynamic between form and transformation. Though they are not commonly labeled as such, many areas of critical and cultural theory focus on subtypes of these actions, such as performativity (Austin, Butler), performance (Schechner, Goffman, Fischer-Lichte), and agency (Taylor 1988; K. Frank). These terms and the critical traditions surrounding them can be reframed in light of the RTG’s question. Theoretically and empirically, it is worth analyzing whether aesthetic practices of democracy are also practices of democratization—that is, forms of social action motivated by de-hierarchization, reduction of privilege, and valorization of individual singularity.

Exemplary thematic complex, Research Area 2:
The second area of potential topics focuses on social form-building at the level of “aesthetic action”—specifically, judgment. Current aesthetic research recognizes affluent democracies as fostering effective community formation through attunement in style (Bassler/Drügh). Following Andreas Reckwitz’s concept of a “society of singularities” (2017), “style communities” (Venus) may seem to be constantly differentiating (fantasy, black metal, science fiction, etc.). However, considering Hannah Arendt’s (1982) interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, one might question whether style communities could be perceived differently. In these communities, the meaning and feeling of community are established through aesthetic judgment—a process that encompasses individual idiosyncrasies and commonalities. As discussed above, in Kantian terms, personal sensual perception—or aesthetic judgment—is conceptually “imputed” to others. Arendt views this intersubjective judgment as a fundamental democratic procedure. Whether style communities are truly democratic spaces of pluralistic judgment (Loidolt 2017; Rebentisch 2022) or symptoms of segmented publics driven by the logic of creative economies depends in part on whether these spaces allow dissensus to be integrated into their form or externalized through distinction.

This area examines the dynamic between form and dissensus from the perspective of objects and their materiality. Along with the ephemeral “space of appearance,” the tangible “world of things” constitutes the “inter-esse” of the collective world (Arendt, 1958). The “world of things” can give and transcend form in democratic coexistence. As with action, aesthetic objects should not be considered a special class of objects. Objects are aesthetic when viewed from a certain perspective and when certain modes of interaction or use are emphasized. Aesthetic objects must be studied in relation to practices because “objects are embedded in social practices” (Reckwitz 2016, 38). However, they are also products of social practices (see Appadurai 1986 and Latour/Weibel). Following John Dewey (1939), we presume that democratic practices give rise to competing visions and representations of community. These visions and representations are “articulated” in aesthetic objects (see Taylor 1988, 38–41), whether as commodities, in the design of private and public spaces, in the arts, or as forms of communication in various media. Aesthetic objects are essential to democracy. In Arendt’s view, they lend temporal stability to the political space of appearance, which must continually be re-actualized. Although new things are constantly produced, existing objects persist beyond any particular social action. Objects foreground their own materiality, just as the political world alludes to the “earth” that grounds it. This poses basic challenges for democracies and raises questions about uninterrogated notions of “dwelling” and their tendency to exploit natural environments, often in “democratically legitimized” ways. This becomes especially apparent when unmade “things of nature” are grouped under the category of objects, which implies that they belong to living matter or, at the very least, have agency (Latour 2001, 2014; Bennett 2009). Climate protection, for example, requires a long-term political vision, which often clashes with the short-term focus of democratic policy (see Abadi, Moellendorf). Authoritarian regimes sometimes “solve” this temporal dilemma by imposing permanent political rule. Democracy, however, must look for strategies elsewhere. Philosophy and the arts—such as American Transcendentalism—can be used to study longstanding traditions that have sought either to productively aestheticize or overcome the temporal incongruence between nature and democracy, (Bennett 2002, Buell 1995, Cavell 2003, Guthrie, Schaefer 2020, van Rahden/Völz, Voelz 2010, Voelz 2019). Interdisciplinary fields such as anthropocene studies (Latour; Haraway; Nixon; Bennett 2020), ecocriticism (Buell 2003; Schaefer 2004; Zapf), posthumanism (Wolfe; Braidotti; Clarke), new materialism (DeLanda; Meillassoux), and biopolitics (Lemke, Campbell, Sitze; Felcht 2016a) provide diverse contexts that can help shape and contextualize research into the aesthetic objects of democracy.

Exemplary thematic complex, Research Area 3:
The third area of potential research topics focuses on the level of “aesthetic objects” and addresses the recent growing interest in ecological and nature-theoretical questions, as well as the development of new theories. Approaches such as new materialism and new ecologies have produced topics and vocabularies that could be grouped under the umbrella of “philosophy of life,” a long-marginalized area of research, especially in the German context. Currently, many researchers at the intersection of philosophy, literary and cultural studies, sociology, political theory, and intellectual and scientific history are developing new forms of contemporary vitalism and formulating novel political perspectives based on it (Arsiç; Bennett 2009; Braidotti; Worms). This is reflected in an understanding of materiality which seeks to overcome categorical distinctions between humans, nature, and objects and which attributes living qualities to both objects and abstract communalities. These theories often draw on literature, in which the world of things is commonly animated and where animals are regularly anthropomorphized. Thus, the RTG welcomes a field that focuses on the theoretical and literary animation of things in the context of “vitalist” theories of democracy (see Latour’s “parliament of things” [2002]). The epistemic interest here lies in describing the conditions for life and for the survival of democratic communities, as well as the mechanisms of political resilience and regeneration, especially in light of the new relationships between political communities, nature, and things. Thus, the implications of describing democracy as a “form of coexistence” become a central focus of inquiry.

The fourth level of our model focuses on the collective dimension of sensorial experience. For this level, we use the term “aesthetic experience.” This term refers to the affects, emotions, feelings, and processes of meaning-making that are triggered by sensorial stimuli, objects, and interactions, as well as their mediation or articulation—especially in media (including “social media”). In other words, we define aesthetic experience as the actualization of structures of affect and emotion, as well as the creation of spaces of meaning accompanying them. We consider the competing definition that restricts aesthetic experience to encounters with art that culminate in subjective reflection to be a subtype (Deines et al.; Kern/Sonderegger; Shusterman/Tomlin). Unlike in the Deleuzian or Massumian approach, we believe affects cannot be categorically separated from feelings and emotions as if they were pre-social, pre-cognitive, or autonomous. In analyzing the aesthetic-affective experience of democratic coexistence, we find it more productive to begin with subjectively experienced affects and consider their necessary mediation, cognitive processing, and formal describability (Ahmed; Berlant; Brenman; Brinkema; Cvetkovich; Stewart et al.). We assume that democratic coexistence is saturated with affects, emotions, and passions that exhibit collective patterns, which can be analyzed as aesthetic forms. These affects, emotions, and passions are not confined to the subjective realm of the individual experiencing them; they are also transmitted as moods, atmospheres, coloring of meaning, or through the explicit communication of feelings. If democratic sociality consists of individuals and collectives determining how to shape their shared existence, then affective atmospheres always inform their discursive and deliberative modes of negotiation (Slaby/Bens 349). However, practices of negotiation are not only embedded affectively in the political sphere, but also in supposedly non-political social interactions. The form of democratic coexistence is shaped by “structures of feeling” (Raymond Williams) and “affective landscapes” (Lawrence Grossberg). The boundaries of these structures do not align with the established distinctions between “political” and “pre-political,” or “public” and “private.” Regarding the RTG’s overarching question of how to more precisely determine the dynamics between form and transformation in democratic coexistence, the dimension of aesthetic experience is a largely unexplored field of research. Since collective patterns of feeling accompany the struggles for transformation and preservation of form, it is worth inquiring whether a “grammar” of collective emotions can be detected in democratic contestation. Key emotions include enthusiasm (Mohrmann), hope (Appadurai 2007; Möllerndorf), anger (Stauffer), indignation (Innerarity; Creech), envy (Ngai 2005; Völz 2017), resentment (Fassin), disgust (Menninghaus; Wolff; Ngai 2005), and boredom (Anderson; Gräfe). However, systematic analyses of the affective dynamics of democratic debates about meaning and sensibility are lacking.

Collective emotions and their aesthetic forms also define areas in which democratic coexistence is limited, whether due to populist or illiberal attacks (Hediger/Simon; Illouz; Levitsky/Ziblatt; Runciman; Mounk; Voelz/Freischlager 2019) or deeply entrenched exclusionary mechanisms. The diagnoses of “social death” central to Afropessimism, for example, derive their intensity in part from the seemingly transhistorical persistence of the affective structures underlying racism against Black people. Afropessimism posits an ontological exclusion of Black bodies from the body politic (Wilderson, following Patterson). These dominant structures of feeling appear to paralyze democratic debates. Black artists and theorists respond with aesthetic counterstrategies. Current practitioners of the “Black Aesthetic” movement demonstrate this response (Bradley; Hartman 2019; McKittrick 2021; Moten 2018; Weheliye). Hence, for research on the aesthetic experience of democracy, it is essential to consider not only forms of democratic coexistence but also a life in which “togetherness” is thrown into question.

Exemplary thematic complex, Research Area 4:
The fourth area of potential research topics addresses the relationship between genres of social media and political violence in India with regard to “aesthetic experience.” Social media platforms such as WhatsApp, WeChat, X, and TikTok—the infrastructures of contemporary global digital culture—are permeated by the techniques and effects of war. The militarization of everyday social life on these platforms is evident in the normalization of terms such as “online troll armies,” “digital warriors,” “camouflage,” and “infiltration.” These terms reveal the emergence of new techniques of war that engender violence in both virtual and real spaces. These spheres are linked by intense sensorial experiences that connect bodily sensations (including physical harm), imagination, and cognitive, discursive, and remediation processes (Bolter/Grusin; Erll/Rigney). India’s democracy is a recent example of such hybrid forms of everyday militarization and violence, as it is increasingly challenged by illiberal and populist forces (see also Malreddy). Associated aesthetic experiences can be studied by examining the relationships among everyday digital media technologies, image-making practices, and forms of violence. Studying genres of social media, from Telegram channels to DIY lynching video tutorials, may provide insight into public spheres where hate and violence area able to spread. So, a new area of media analysis emerges, offering nuanced insights into the political culture of authoritarian populism under the Modi regime. Such an analysis explores how the government mobilizes and utilizes a spectrum of emotions, including fear, guilt, shame, anger, hate, and betrayal, and how these emotions are manifested in everyday democratic life (Gudavarthy 2019, 2023).